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Abstract 
Controls are used to modify the behaviour of a system. Scheduling rules can realize fairness 
when working as controls of the whole system. In decentralized systems such schedules are 
possible only for individual agents, while global controls may be replaced by social laws, etc. 
The aim of the paper is to study the effects of combining controls at one hand, and of distributing 
global control goals at the other hand. 
1. Introduction 
Fairness is considered as freedom from starvation. This means that each (enabled) 
action will eventually proceed. Certain control is needed to ensure fairness in the case 
of conflicting actions. Appropriate scheduling policies (e.g. queues) can do the job. 
Usually, system properties may change in the presence of such controls. For example, 
liveness and safety properties may change, and the computational power of Petri Nets 
is extended to the power of counter automata [5]. This holds not only for fair controls, 
the same is true for maximal parallelism [24], and for nearly all kinds of “essential” 
changes of the firing strategy in Petri nets (cf. [3, Theorem 7.41). 
Problems become much harder in the case of decentralized systems like open systems 
[15] or domains for agent oriented programming [25]. The subsystems are influencing 
(and restricting -or controlling) each other. Moreover, special control policies (e.g. for 
fairness) can work only locally, since there is no use of a global control regime for all 
actions of the whole system. The question is whether decentralized controls can realize 
fairness as well. I illustrate the problem with an example: 
Each one of three robots a, b and c is to do repeatedly two private actions, say 
actions al and a2 are done by robot a, 61 and b2 are done by b, cl and c2 by c. To 
ensure fairness of these actions, each robot x may have to alternate while performing 
its actions nl and x2. Now suppose that there are conflicts: The actions al, bl and cl 
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are performed using a hammer, while ~2, b2 and c2 require a spanner. If there are 
available only one hammer and only one spanner, then the robots are in conflicts. If 
robot a is the quickest one, it may always succeed in getting the necessary tool. If 
robot b is quicker than c, and if it is able to switch its desire to the just available tool, 
then it may also have the chance to work. (But some further assumptions concerning 
b are already introduced at this point!) At the end, it may be the case that c does not 
come to work. 
It turns out, that additional assumptions are necessary for fairness. An additional 
schedule for the consecution (succession) of the robots, e.g. alternation of a, b and 
c, can be used to give each robot a chance. This leads to hierarchical controls as 
suggested in [7], where fairness of the whole system is obtained by fair consecutions 
of the agents and fair behaviour of each individual agent (cf. Proposition 2 in this 
paper). This is related also to the use of the so-called “social laws” in agent societies 
[9,W. 
Further problems arise from cooperation and ordering requirements. Again, their 
realization by a global control of all actions of each agent is not possible, since this 
contradicts the idea of decentralization. The question arises if those requirements can 
be met also by decentralized (individual) controls. 
The following kinds of controls can be compared: (a) global system control of all 
actions of all agents, (b) global control of the consecutions of the agents, (c) individual 
controls for each agent, (d) hierarchical control as combination of (b) and (c). 
In a related sense, the effects of the controls can be considered from the viewpoint 
of (a) the whole system (i.e. for all actions of all agents), (b) the consecutions of the 
agents, (c) each agent (i.e. for the corresponding individual actions). 
A series of questions is connected with these strategies and viewpoints. One can ask 
for an appropriate global control to obtain a special behaviour. Then the decisions made 
by this control can be distributed to individual decisions of the agents. The question 
arises, if this distribution works properly. Vice versa, one may start from individual 
controls realizing certain agent properties (e.g. fairness). Then the question is whether 
the combination of these controls meets the properties for the whole system (as the 
initial example shows, this need not be the case for fairness). Thus, it is necessary to 
study the effects of combination and of distribution for controls (where fairness may 
serve as an example). 
The paper is organized as follows: First I give formal definitions of multi-agent 
systems, fair multi-agent systems and fair agents. Some results are cited from [7]. 
Next I define what I call a control in this formalism. There are two approaches: The 
control can be introduced by its restriction of the original behaviour, and it can be 
defined as a choice for the next action regarding the history. At the first glance both 
approaches are equivalent, but going more into the details of control interference and 
behavioural changes, the both approaches are applicable in different ways. 
Two kinds of fair controls can be considered. Since control is a restriction, fairness 
can be realized by fewer enabled actions (such that those actions are not considered 
as waiting). Since this may not meet the real intention of a fair control, I shall prefer 
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a second viewpoint where all actions which have been enabled in the uncontrolled 
system have to get their chance. 
Combinations of controls are considered under the view point of simultaneous con- 
trols, and under the view point of successive refinements, respectively. 
The global effects of individual (agent) controls for the whole multi-agent systems 
are investigated using the formalism of simultaneous controls. Vice versa, the faith- 
ful distribution of global controls to individual ones requires additional conditions or 
additional communication. 
The following notions are used: The set of all finite sequences over a set (alphabet) 
T is denoted by T*, e denotes the empty word. The set of all infinite sequences over 
T is denoted by Too. I denote the number of occurrences of a symbol t E T in the 
sequence w E T” U Tm (Pa&h vector) by rc,(t). 3” denotes “for infinitely many”. 
The prefix relations are denoted by C and c. The set of all prefixes of a (finite or 
infinite) sequence w is denoted by Pref (w). For a set M of sequences the set of all 
prefixes of these sequences i  denoted by Pref (M). 
2. Definition of multi-agent systems 
Fairness properties and controls are defined with respect o the behaviour of a system. 
The behaviour of a system is built up from atomic actions (or events). These actions 
can occur sequentially and concurrently. Different calculi have been developed for 
formalizing concurrent behaviour (cf. e.g. [ 16,21,20]), but the simple approach of 
nondeterministic nterleaving and a description using action sequences i  sufficient for 
the purposes of this paper. 
An important question concerns the problem what is called an “atomic” action/event. 
Since the formalism is based on the interleaving semantics, the mixture of choice (an 
agent u decides between different of her possible actions), chance (from viewpoint of 
a: occurrences of someone lse’s actions or environmental events change her possibili- 
ties) and concurrency (concurrent actions are described by arbitrary interleaving) must 
be used carefully. Similar problems are already known for concurrent systems: some 
actions must be considered indivisible (e.g. for metaphors), while others must be split 
up to obtain a useful description (cf. the LCR-restriction discussed in [20]). 
As in [4] the system behaviour is described by a prefix closed language L c T*, 
where T is the finite set of atomic actions. A sequence p E L describes a possible se- 
quence (history) of actions. Concurrent actions appear in a nondeterministically chosen 
order. Since each prefix of such a sequence is also a possible behaviour of the system, 
the language L is prefix closed. Note that states are implicitly present by the histories: 
Given an initial state and a sequence of actions, the resulting state can be computed 
if a transition table is known. 
I denote a finite set of agents by A. Each agent a E A has a set T, of its individual 
actions. This is reflected by the following definition of multi-agent systems (MAS). 
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Definition 1. A MAS is given by A4 = [A, T, z,L] where 
A is a finite set of agents, 
T is a finite set of all actions/events occurring in M, 
r is a mapping from A into the powerset 2T of T where T, := z(a) is the set of all 
actions/events from T which are connected with agent a E A (I suppose T = U{ T,/a E 
Al), 
L is a prefix closed subset of T” which describes the behaviour of the MAS. 
The sets T, define the restricted knowledge and the restricted influence of the agents 
a with respect o the whole system. In general I do not suppose that the sets T, have 
to be disjoint. Thus, actions or events shared by different agents can be denoted by the 
same element . 
The interpretation of t as an action (an agent is “actively” doing something) or as 
an event (an agent is more passive, i.e. by observing something) is left open. Thus, 
if an agent a is doing an action t while b observes this action, this may be described 
by t E T, and t E Tb. Later on one may distinguish between “active” and “passive” 
actions of an agent, such that an agent is able to control only its active actions, while 
the passive actions (e.g. observations) are controlled from somewhere outside of this 
agent. 
It is a question of useful/realistic models, how the sets of “active”, “observable”, 
“non-observable”, ‘unknown” (etc.) actions are defined for the agents. Again, the sit- 
uation is similar to interleaving semantics in concurrent systems where a faithml de- 
scription is necessary to get reasonable results [20]. Additional requirements may be 
necessary for multi-agent systems. The problem of a “faithful” description of agent 
behaviour was discussed to some extent in [7]. For the purposes of this paper, the sets 
T, are sulhcient. 
Following these intentions about the sets T,, I define the behaviour of the agents 
a in a MAS by the projections of L to the sets T,. In a related sense, the consecu- 
tions of the agents (needed for the hierarchical controls mentioned above) are defined 
over A*. 
Definition 2. Let A4 = [A, T, z, L] be a MAS, and a E A. 
(1) The behaviour of a in M is given by 
L, := h,(L) & T;, 
where h, is a homomorphism erasing all t @ T,, i.e. for t E T: h,(t) := if t E T, then 
t else e. 
(2) The consecutions of the agents are given by 
L,‘j := hA(L) q29*, 
where hA is the homomorphism which assigns to each action t its owner(s), 
i.e., hA is defined by hA(t) := (a/t E T,}. 
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3. Fairness in m~ti-agent systems 
Fairness properties express that each action (or each enabled action) will eventually 
proceed and not be delayed for ever. There are different approaches to define fairness 
with different meanings (cf. [ 1,12,18,20]). In this paper the notion of (strong) fairness 
is investigated, where an action which is infinitely often enabled must not be delayed 
forever. This understanding of fairness differs from other fairness notions where some 
“fair distribution” of some “values” is investigated as in [ 11,271. In my paper, fairness 
concerns the infinite behaviour of a system, which is given by the adherence: 
Definition 3. Let L be a prefix closed language over an alphabet T. The adherence of 
L is defined by 
Now fairness is defined by 
Definition 4. Let L be a prefix closed language over T. L is fair w.r.t. T’ C T (short: 
T/-fair, or only fair if T’ = T, respectively) iff 
VW E Adh(L)\Jt E T’ : ((SIcop II w : pt EL) -+ z&t) = 00) 
According to this definition I define fair MAS and fair agents as follows (cf. [7] for 
a more detailed discussion of the definitions and propositions in this section): 
Defi~tion 5. Let M = [A, T, r,L] be a MAS, and a f A. 
(a) M is fair iff L is T-fair. 
(b) a is locally fair iff L, is T*-fair. 
(c) a is globally fair iff L is T,-fair. 
Regarding an agent as an autonomous entity, local fairness is preferable since global 
fairness reflects the behaviour of the whole system. It turns out that both notions are 
incomparable. Furthermore, global fairness of the agents coincides with system fairness, 
while local fairness does not {77. 
Proposition 1. (I) The notions of global fairness and local fairness are in general 
not &omparab~e. 
(2) A MAS is fair @all agents are globally fair. 
(3) There are multi-agent systems M which are fair, where a/I agents a are not 
~o~a~~y fair. 
(4) There are multi-agent systems M which are not fair, where all agents a are 
~o~al~~ fair. 
In the consequence, the analysis of system fairness cannot be done locally by 
analysing the individual (local) fairness properties of the agents. This can be inter- 
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preted as a hint that local fair controls of the agents need not result in fairness of 
the whole system. A positive result holds for an “hierarchical” approach using the 
consecutions of the agents [7]: 
Proposition 2. Let M = [A, T, z,L] be a MAS. 
(a) If M is fair, then LA must be fair. 
(b) If LA is fair and all agents a E A are locally fair, then M is fair. 
This result extends the one given in [7] as far as the sets T, need not be disjoint . 
Proof. (a) If there exists W E Adh(LA ) with 
3”Q C W : QA’ E LA for some A’ E 2A, 
then there exists w E Adh(L) with hA(w) = W and some t with hA(t) = A’ such that 
(since hA is nonerasing and the sets T and A are finite). Then by fairness of L we get 
n,,,(t) = co and hence n&A’) = 00. 
(b) For w E Adh(L) we have to show that the condition 
(Fq c w : qt E L) + 7Cw(t) = cc 
holds if LA is fair and if all a E A are locally fair. Corresponding to w there exists 
W = hA(w) E Adh(LA), and then (Fq C w : qt E L) implies (3”Q C W : QA’ E LA) 
for A’ = hA(t). 
Since LA is fair, we get x&A’) = CO. Hence, w, := h,(w) is infinite for all a E A’. 
Since all a E A are locally fair we obtain n,(t) = nnho(,)(t) = cc which completes the 
proof. 0 
4. Controls 
Let us start with some considerations concerning arbitrary systems (they are valid 
for MAS and for agents as well; in the next section I shall discuss the special problems 
for MAS). I suppose the behaviour being described by some prefix closed language L 
over a finite alphabet X of actions/events. 
A control of the system gives advices in the case of possible choices. If p was 
the action sequence up to a certain moment, then the next (uncontrolled) action may 
be some action x E X with px E L. These choices can be stronger determined by a 
strategy (control) 5: 
Definition 6. A (global) strategy 5 for a system with behaviour L 2X* is a function 
5 : x* + 2x. 
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The behaviour of the system under the control by the strategy 5 is then given by 
L/5 =Df {p/p E L A vrx E p : x E 5(r)}. 
Thus l(p) restricts the possible choices for the next action: After the occurrence of 
p the next action may be only some x E r(p) with px E L. 
These choices may be again nondeterministic if card(t(p)) 22, the work finishes if 
t(p) = 0 or if px q! L for all x E t;(p). 
A scheduling policy for fairness may be built by queues. Thereby the choices are 
restricted with respect o the waiting times of the actions. While these waiting times are 
not explicitly given by the histories, they could be computed from a history p and the 
behaviour L of a system. Hence the description of a control for a single system by a 
strategy 5 is sufficient (not only in the scheduling example): All necessary information 
is at least implicitly given by p. 
This remains true as long as we consider a system with a fixed behaviour description 
L. Using the same scheduling policy (e.g. by waiting times) for another system with 
another behaviour L we can come to a different strategy 5. Hence the same control 
rule must in general be described by different strategies 5 for different systems. This 
forces us to look for another description of controls. 
Each control of a system with the behaviour L results in a restricted behaviour 
L’ CL. Vice versa, each (prefix closed) subset L’ 2 L determines a control for that 
system, the related strategy 5~1 is given by tt,(p) =JJ~ {x /px E L’}. Hence I can 
define following [4]: 
Definition 7. (1) A control of a system with behaviour L is given by a nonempty 
prefix closed subset L’ of L. 
(2) Let 9 denote the set of all nonempty prefix closed languages (i.e. all behavioural 
descriptions of any systems), and let Y(L) denote the set of all nonempty prefix closed 
sublanguages of a prefix closed language L E 3, i.e. all restrictions (controls) of L. 
Then a control principle c is given by 
c : 9 -+ 26” with 0 # c(L) C Y(L). 
A control rule r is given by 
r : Y + 9 with r(L) E Z(L). 
By means of control principles we can describe the controls realizing special proper- 
ties like fairness, deadlock avoidance, liveness, etc. Using this notion and Definition 5 
of fairness I could define the fair controls by the control principle 
fair(L) =Df {L’ /L’ CL A L/fair}. 
But this understanding of fair controls has some disadvantages. It considers e.g. L’ = 
Pref((ab)m) as a fair control for any language over an alphabet T with {a, b} & T. 
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But while this is correct for L = {u,b}*, it should be rejected for L = {a, b,c}* 
since the action c is always enabled (w.r.t. L) while performing (ab)m, but it never 
appears. 
This situation is overcome by the following definitions: 
Definition 8. Let L, L’ be prefix closed languages over a finite set T with L’ CL (i.e. 
L’ E Y(L)). L’ is relatively fair w.r. t. T’ C T in L (for short T’-rfuir in L, or only 
rfuir in L if T’ = T, respectively) iff 
VW E Adh(L’)Vt E T’ : ((3”~ C w : pt E L) --) n,,,(t) = CO). 
The control principle of relative fairness w.r.t. T’ in L is defined by 
T’-@r(L) =~f {L’ / L’ G L A L’ is T’-rfuir in L}. 
I shall investigate the relative fair controls for the MAS. One can also describe 
special control mechanisms like queues by related control principles, or (if unique) by 
control rules. A control rule may realize special properties (like fairness, etc.), if each 
controlled system satisfies the related conditions which can be expressed by a control 
principle. 
Definition 9. A control rule r satisfies a control principle c (r is a c-control rule) iff 
r(L) E c(L) for all L E Y. 
In this way we can talk about fair and rfuir control rules, realized e.g. by scheduling 
policies. Then we have 
Proposition 3. Each rfuir control rule is a fair control rule, but in general the con- 
verse is not true. 
Proof. rfuir(L) Cfuir(L) holds by the definitions for every L E 2’. Thus we have 
r(L) E rfuir(L) cfuir(L) for the rfuir control rules r. q 
Each strategy 4 defines a control rule rg(L) = L/c, but in general a control rule 
cannot be described by only one strategy. Instead of this, a control rule r specifies a 
special strategy FL via L’ = r(L) G L for each system behaviour L: 
PL(p) := {x) px E r(L)}. 
In this sense, control rules are the more flexible notion, which reflect the changes in 
different systems. 
Special control mechanisms like scheduling or “social laws” (cf. [9,23,26]) are 
considered as control rules. Since they are designed to meet special properties in each 
system, it is reasonable to suppose that their applications in local entities preserve this 
properties. Hence, if distribution of controls is understood in this meaning, there is no 
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doubt that the agents will satisfy the same properties as the system after the ~s~bution 
of a control rule. A similar reasoning is not valid in the case of combinations of control 
rules as the initial example has shown. 
5. Combination of controls 
Combinations of controls are needed in order to investigate the effects of different 
individual controls for the whole MAS. They can be defined in different ways. Here I 
introduce two kinds of combinations: parallel combination (“follow the advices simul- 
taneously given by the controls”) and successive refinements (“apply a further control 
to a system where the behaviour is already restricted by a former control”). 
Defi~tio~ 10. The conj~ction F-~&Q of two control rules rr and r2 is given by 
The supe~osition F-J o r:! of two control rules q and ~-2 is given by 
The conjunction of control rules is commutative and associative, while the super- 
position is in general not: As an example we may consider the two control rules for 
languages over the alphabet {a, b) : 
~1: “prefer longer delayed actions, start with a.” 
r2: “prefer a in case of conflicts.” 
Then we obtain for the language L = {a, b}*: 
and 
r201(L)) = r2WejY(abY)) = PwXabY), 
but 
With similar intentions we consider the conjunction (“simultaneous controls”) and 
the superposition (“successive refinements”) for strategies. It turns out, that both notions 
are identical, 
Devotion 11. The conj~ction <t&r& of two strategies t;t and 52 is given by ti&&(p) 
=~f Ct(~)n t2b) for P E T*. 
Then we have: 
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Proposition 4. For languages L and strategies l,, 52 we have L/(cl&&) = 
(L/b )I52 = W2M = L/f5 n M2. 
Proof. It suffices to have the following derivations: 
Ll(tla2) = {P E L 1w-x c p : x E (51&52)(y)} 
= {P E L I vr.x L p : x E 51(r) A 52b-1) 
= {p E L 1 Vrx C p : x E 51(r)} n {p E L 1 VKX g p : x E (2(r)} 
= L/51 f-l L/52, 
pE(L/r1)/52*PEL/51 A~‘rxCP:xErz(r) 
* p E L A Wx L p : x E [t(r) A vrx c_ p : x E (2(Y) 
- p E L A b-x L p : (x E 5*(r) A x E 52(Y)) 
* p E Ll(51&r2). 0 
For a notion of superposition reflecting stepwise refinement, the result of the superpo- 
sition <i o 52 of two strategies (1 and (2 should be given by L/(51 052) =Df (L/(I)/ 52. 
Then (by Proposition 4) the results of superposition and conjunction are identical. Both 
the superposition and the conjunction are commutative and associative in this case. 
Hence the superposition has somewhat different meanings for strategies and control 
rules. It describes all related successive refinements of a system in the case of control 
rules. It describes a single refinement (which reduces to the conjunction) in the case 
of strategies. 
The conjunction of strategies and control rules are closely related to each other as 
the following proposition shows: 
Proposition 5. (a) If rl and r-2 are control rules, then it holds for each L E 2’: 
5 ~I&aJ - _ y1,L & y2.L. 
(b) If (1, (2 are strategies, then 
%&% = r’5 &52 
Proof. (a) tqL is defined by FL(p) := {x 1 px E r(L)}. Hence we get 
C! r1&r2~L( p) = {x 1 px E q(L) n r2(L)} 
= {x I PX E rl(L)} n {x I PX E 72(L)) 
= 5”,L(p> n PL( p) 
= yd & 5”qp) 
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(b) 
= L/(51&h) by Proposition 4 
= q, &C,(L) q 
6. Controls in multi-agent systems 
As already stated, there can be controls in a MAS A4 = [A, T, r, L] at the different 
levels, for the whole system, for the cons~cutions of the agents, and in~vidually for 
each agent. Then the control rules and strategies, respectively, are to be defined over the 
related alphabets T (whole system), A (consecutions) and T, (agents). For simplicity, 
I denote the agents in the following by A = { 1, . . . . n}, and the alphabets of the agents 
by T, , . . . . Tn. 
A global strategy for the whole system M is denoted by Z, where E : T* --+ 2T. 
A strategy for the consecutions of the agents is denoted by (I, where a : (2A)* -+ 22A. 
An individual strategy for the agent a is denoted by a, where oa : T,” -+ 2”. 
Now I have to explain how the strategies CI and a, effect the work a MAS. Therefore 
I define the induced global strategies: 
Defi~tion 12. Let a be a strategy for the consecutions, and let era be an in~vidual 
strategy of an agent a in a MAS M. Then the induced global strategies C, and XC= 
are defined for p E T* as follows: 
UP) =rDf WUt) E Hh(P>>)2 &(P) =of G&(P)) u V - r,). 
By these definitions, an induced global strategy is considered as the only control in 
the system. Its result to the behaviour of an agent a and to the consecutions, respec- 
tively, do coincide with the corresponding results of ca and ~1: 
Proposition 6. La/a, = (L/2&),, LA/a = (-h%z)A. 
Proof. (a) 
q E La/oa +-+ q E L, A Qst’ c: q : t’ E Q(S) 
t+ 3p f L : ha(p) = q A v&St’ c: q : t’ E c&(s) 
w3pEL:h,(p)=qI\VrtIZp:tEETa(h,(~))VtftTT, 
t+ 3p E L : ha(p) = q A vrt c: p : t E C,(r) 
++ZlpEL:h,(p)=qAa,, 
++ 4 E (Lb,,, la 
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UELAIactUELAI\tjVA’CU:A’Ea(V) 
++ZipEL:h,(p)=U/\VVA’C:lJ:A’Ea(V) 
* 3p E L : h,(p) = U A Vrt C: p : hA(t) E a(hA(r)) 
++3pEL:ha(p)=UA’drtC:p:tfZ,(r) 
+-+ 3p f L : h&p) = U A p E L/,2$ 
c-) u E h/W&) 
In the consequence, special properties of an agent or of the cons~utions can be 
realized in the system by the same strategy as long as it is the only control. I shall 
discuss the effects of interfering strategies later. 
Concerning relative fairness, a single individual property is locally (!) preserved in 
the system. It follows immediately from the last proposition: 
Proposition 7. IfL,/ua f T,-rfair(L,) then (L/C,), E T*-rf~~r(L*). 
Remark. The last proposition was given as follows in [6]: If LO/a, E To-rfuir(L,) then 
L/C, E T,-rfair(L). 
This is not correct as the follo~ng example shows: 
T = {a,b}, L = {a,b}*, T, = {a}, L, = {a}*. 
dp) = {a} for all p, &Jp) = {a,b}. 
Hence 
L&, = {a}*, L/Z, = {a, b}* $ T,-rfair(L). 
Moreover, the definition of relative fairness as given in this paper, is related to 
languages L, L’ with L’ C L. It is difficult to interpret it for homomorphic images as in 
the case of L’ = h,(L). Hence, related replacements have been made in the Propositions 
8 and 9, too. 
Now we have to consider the common work of different individual strategies with 
or without a consecution strategy in the system M. For the combination I use the 
conjunction of the induced global strategies, i.e. C,, &. . . &Xr;, and &, & . . v &C,&Z:,, 
respectively. Hence, a sequence p E L of the MAS is still possible under the common 
control by the individ~l strategies cri, -, a,, iff it can be performed according to all 
related decisions of these strategies. If we have an additional consecution control by 
some a, then the ordering of the agents following p must be permitted by a. 
While the conjunction of relative fair agent controls need not result in a relative fair 
system control (consider e.g. TI = (a}, T2 = {x} and L = {u,x}* with 61 E {a}, 
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02 {x}), fair agent controls and a relative fair consecution 
control results in a relative fair MAS: 
Proposition 8. (a) There are MAS M = [A, T, z, L] and individual strategies oI, . . . . rs,, 
such that Ll/ol E Tl-rfair(Ll), . . . , L,/o, E T,,-rfair(L,), but L/,X0, & - . . &Zon 6 rfair(L). 
(b) For all MAS M = [A, T, z, L], all individual strategies ~1,. . . , cr, and all conse- 
cution strategies CI : 
Zf L,/ol E Tl-rfair(Ll),..., L,,/(T, E T,,-rfair(L,), and LA/~ E zA-rfair(LA), then 
L/C,, 6%. . &C,n&&zlu E rfair(L)). 
Proof. (a) Example: 
T = {a,b}, Tl = {a}, T2 = {b}. 
L = {a,b}*, L1 = {a}*, L2 = {b}‘. 
01(p) = Ia), c72( p) = {b} for arbitrary p. 
C,,(p) = {a, b}, C,,(p) = {a, b} for arbitrary p. 
Ll/al = {a}* E Tl-rfair(L,), L2/02 = {b}* E Tz-rfair(L2). 
L/(C,, &C,, ) = L = {a, b}* @’ rfuir(L). 
(b) We consider t E T, and an infinite sequence w E Adh(L/C,,&. . . &C,&C,x), 
with 30°q C w : qt E L. We have to show n,(t) = m. 
By Proposition 4 we obtain 
w E Adh(L/C,, 8z . . . L?LZ’,~ &Cm) 
= Adh(L/C,, n . . . n L/& n L/c,) 
C Adh(L/&). 
Since hA is nonerasing and by Proposition 6, we obtain w’ := hA(w) E hA(Adh(L/C,)) 
z Adh(hA(L/C,)) = LA/U. By translation of 3”q [II w : qt E L from above to LA = 
/IA(L) using U = hA(q), B = hA(t) we get ?‘U C w’ : UB E LA. Furthermore, since 
LA/U E zA-rfair(LA), z,/(B) = xh,(,,,,(B) = CO. Now suppose that our t from above 
belongs to a set T, (obviously with a E B). Then h,(w) is an infinite sequence (from 
TOW), since nh,(,)(B) = DC). We get (as for w) 
W” = h,(w) E h,(Adh(L/C,, &. . . &Zo,,&&c,)) 
= h,(Adh(L& n . . . n L/c,” n L/C,)) 
= Adh(L,/a,). 
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Now 303q w : E L above leads h,(q) = r) to F’r C w” : rt E L,. 
Since La/~, E T,-rfuir(L,), it holds rc,,,~(t) = 0~). Then it follows rc,(t) = co. 0 
The second part of the proposition corresponds to Proposition 2 where we had a 
related result. In the case of control principles the problems become harder to inves- 
tigate. The introductory example shows, that e.g. scheduling by longest waiting time 
for each agent is in general not equivalent to the related scheduling of all actions in 
the system. Moreover, in this case the system even may be not (relatively) fair. 
7. Distribution of controls 
In the last section I have combined individual controls to global controls. But the 
individual controls as well as the consecution controls cannot regard arbitrary global 
requirements. The reason for this is the impossibility to distribute arbitrary system 
controls to individual controls as can be seen in the sequel. Even the use of consecution 
controls does not help in general. 
As mentioned at the end of Section 4, the distribution of control rules can preserve 
their intended properties. On the other hand, the combination of distributed control 
rules can be understood by the combination of the corresponding strategies. A more 
detailed discussion may use an augmentation of the histories by the sets of enabled 
actions at each step. 
The distribution of a strategy is considered as the restriction of a given control to 
the agents (and may be: additionally to a consecution control): 
Definition 13. Let C be a strategy for the MAS M. The distributions of C are defined 
as follows: 
a; : T,* --f 2Ta with a:(q) = C(h;‘(q)) n T, 
is the distribution of C for an agent a, 
CCC : (2A)f + 22A with a’(q) = hA(Z(h,‘(q))) 
is the distribution of C to the consecutions. 
Now I consider the problems 
l if the properties of the strategy C are valid also for the distributions, 
a how the combination of the distributions to a new global strategy differs from the 
original strategy, 
l if the properties of the original strategy do hold again for the combination. 
The answers concerning relative fairness are given by the following propositions: 
Proposition 9. (1) Zf L/Z E rfuir(L) then LA/U’ E 2A-rfair(L~). 
(2) There exist MAS A4 = [A, T,z,L] and strategies C such that L/Z E rfair(L), 
but all L,lai # T,-rfair(Lu). 
H.-D. Burkhardl Theoretical Computer Science 189 (1997) 109-127 123 
Proof. (a) We consider an infinite sequence WE Adh(LA/a’), and B E 2A with 3” U C 
W : UB E LA. We have to show TCW(B) = oi). 
It follows by a lemma from graph theory (“Koenig’s Lemma”) that there must exist 
some w’ E Adh(L/C) with hA(w’) = W. Furthermore, since T is finite, there must exist 
some t with hA(t) = B such that Fq C w’ : qt E L. Since L/C E rfuir(L), we have 
w(t) = co, which implies nw(B) = cm. 
(b) Example: 
L = fWT{(alh)“hb2 In E N} U {(hw)“a1a2 In E N}), 
C(p) = T = {u~,u2,b~,b2} for all p, 
T, = {u1,u2}, L, = Pref({u:+‘uz 1 n E N}), 
L/C = L E l-fair(L), 
but: L,/o,z = L, $ T,-rfuir(L,) 0 
Here we have related results as in the case of analysis, where the system fairness 
need not correspond to the local fairness of the agents (Section 3). 
The recombination of a strategy after its distribution is described by the conjunction 
of the distributed strategies. Thereby the recombination is in general not as restrictive 
as the original strategy (even with a control of the consecutions): 
Proposition 10. Let C : T* + 2T be a strategy for a MAS. Then L/C C 
L/J+)&. . . &qcr;)&+). 
Proof. It follows by the Definitions 3 and 10 for arbitrary t E T, p E T’, a E A: 
t 6 Z(P) * t E q&(p)) v t $! T, 
* t E +,(P). 
In a similar way we obtain t E C(p) + t E C,,c,(p). Together we have t E C(p) =+ 
t E Ccb;)&. . . &C~&C~,~~(p). From this “covering” of C by CCC:,&. . .&SC,,;, 
&C~,Z) we get the inequality. 
The inequality may really hold as for M with: 
Tl = {a, b}, T2 = 1x2 v}, 
L = Pref ({xubx,xuby,xux,xbux,xbuy,xby}) 
such that L2 = Pref ({xx,xy}). 
A strategy C for L following a related scheduling policy may give the 
decisions 
C(xub) = {x} and C(xbu) = {y}. 
This implies Z(+)(x) = {x, y}, and 
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Hence we obtain xaby E L/C,,;,&C,,;)&CC,z), 
while xaby #LIZ. Cl 
As a consequence, the fairness properties need not be preserved by the recombination 
of a distributed strategy: 
Proposition 11. (1) There are MAS M = [A, T, z,L] and strategies C for A4 such 
that L/C E rfair(L), but L/C,,:,&. . . &C,,;,&C,,~, # rfair(L). 
(2) On the other hand, tfL/C(,;)& . . . &Z~,;~&C~,Z~ E rfair(L), then L/Z E rfair(L). 
Proof. (1) is proved by the following example: 
T = {a,b}, TI = {a}, T, = {b}. 
L = {a, b}‘. 
Z defined such that L/C = Pref((ab)oo) E rfair(L). 
Then by (T:(P) = C(h;‘( p)) tl T, we get 
of(a”) = {a}, af(b”) = {b}for all n E N. 
Hence: Z,,,;,(p) = C,,:,(p) = {a, b}for all p. 
In a similar way, we obtain C,,Z,(P) = {a, b} for all p. 
Hence the resulting strategy C(,,f,&. . . &Z,,;,&C,,Z) does not make any 
restriction: 
L/C,,+k . . * &C~,$kC (E ) - L - L = {a, b}* 6 rfair(L). 
(2) is revised with respect to the paper [6]. The following lemma is a consequence 
of Definition 8: 
If L” CL’ and L’ E rfair(L), then L” E rfair(L). (Since Adh(L”) C Adh(L’).) 
Then (2) follows by Proposition 10. 0 
The missing correspondence in Proposition 1 l( 1) arises from the fact that the strat- 
egy C may give different results Z(pl ) and C( pz) for some ~1, p2 which are not 
distinguished from the standing point of an agent a, i.e. for which h,(pl) = h,(pl) 
holds. This is similar to the effect of self-determined agents (cf. [7]). If the strategy C 
does not make such critical decisions, then it can be distributed without problems: 
Proposition 12. Let C : T” + 2T be a strategy for a MAS A4 = [A, T,z,L] where 
for all agents a E A : 
vp,t,p2t EL : 
[t E T, A h&l) = ha( 3 [t E C(PI) ++ t E I(P 
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Then we have: 
and, hence, 
L/C = L/C,,@. . . &C,,$+,, 
and 
Proof. It suffices to show C = Z((I;‘,&. . . &Z~~~~&C~,z~. This is proved as in the proof 
for Proposition 10 with the Definitions 3 and 10: Now we can write equivalences 
instead of the implications (“+“), by the additional conditions. 0 
If a strategy C does not satisfy these conditions, then another way to realize a re- 
lated distribution would need additional communication [ 10, 141 between the agents, 
or additional observation actions of the agents a (by enlarging T, with related “pas- 
sive” actions from other sets T,I), respectively. But it should be remarked that even in 
the case of Proposition 12 some kind of communication, observation or global control 
is needed for the consecution control of the agents. Hence, a fair cooperation “with- 
out communication” [ 131 seems to be not possible, since the agents need the related 
information to follow some kind of rationality or social laws. 
8. Conclusion 
Fairness is often considered as a condition to ensure termination of concurrent pro- 
grams (cf. [12]). Termination aspects as well as reactive behaviour may be relevant 
for multi-agent systems. Thus, the aspect of “fair controls” (cf. [4,5,22]) is important. 
Conflicts may arise between global requirements and individual (local) control. 
A framework based on abstract languages and nondeterministic interleaving was used 
for the investigation of those problems. It is considered as a problem of “faithful mod- 
eling” that the languages contain all necessary information (as in the case of distributed 
system - cf. [20]). 
It is also possible to develop a related framework based on transition systems. But 
(despite the more complicated framework), the state descriptions have some other draw- 
backs in the case of multi-agent systems (cf. [19,8] for a discussion of that topic). 
The framework of abstract languages is also useful for the investigation of interacting 
goals and intentions: Notions from the book [3] can be formalized for MAS, including 
formal differences between goals (desires) and intentions [8]. 
A formalism was presented for describing global and individual controls. It was 
especially used to investigate fair controls and their interactions in multi-agent systems. 
For the example of (relative) fair controls it was shown that individual controls 
of the agents are not sufficient to obtain system fairness. The use of some kind of 
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“hierarchical” control can be understood as a compromise where the global level may 
be realized by certain social laws. There are investigations of social laws in the form 
of behaviour rules (“high level protocols”). These rules are to be programmed for 
all agent implementations by agreement of the programmers. Design and evaluation 
of such protocols may use results from game theory (cf. [23]). Other approaches are 
related to the evolution of social laws [26], and to contributions from social sciences 
[91. 
Distribution of a global control strategy to individual strategies preserves the proper- 
ties of the former one only under special conditions. Such conditions can be replaced 
by additional communications. 
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